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Abstract
Background: Evolutionary autonomous agents are robots or robot simulations whose controller
is a dynamical neural network and whose evolution occurs autonomously under the guidance of a
fitness function without the detailed or explicit direction of an external programmer. They are
embodied agents with a simple neural network controller and as such they provide the optimal
forum by which sensorimotor interactions in a specified environment can be studied without the
computational assumptions inherent in standard neuroscience.
Methods: Evolutionary autonomous agents were evolved that were able to perform identical
movements under two different contexts, one which represented an automatic movement and one
which had a symbolic context. In an attempt to model the automatic-voluntary dissociation
frequently seen in ideomotor apraxia, lesions were introduced into the neural network controllers
resulting in a behavioral dissociation with loss of the ability to perform the movement which had a
symbolic context and preservation of the simpler, automatic movement.
Results: Analysis of the changes in the hierarchical organization of the networks in the apractic
EAAs demonstrated consistent changes in the network dynamics across all agents with loss of
longer duration time scales in the network dynamics.
Conclusion: The concepts of determinate motor programs and perceptual representations that
are implicit in the present day understanding of ideomotor apraxia are assumptions inherent in the
computational understanding of brain function. The strength of the present study using EAAs to
model one aspect of ideomotor apraxia is the absence of these assumptions and a grounding of all
sensorimotor interactions in an embodied, autonomous agent. The consistency of the hierarchical
changes in the network dynamics across all apractic agents demonstrates that this technique is
tenable and will be a valuable adjunct to a computational formalism in the understanding of the
physical basis of neurological disorders.
Background
The conceptual framework by which a neurological syn-
drome such as apraxia is presently explained is based on a
computational understanding of brain function. Briefly,
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this framework assumes the existence of well-defined,
determinate perceptual representations and motor pro-
grams that interact in a fashion similar to the way that
symbols are manipulated in a computer. Recent theoreti-
cal and applied work in natural and artificial systems,
however, has conspired to shift the emphasis in neuro-
science from the computational paradigm to a dynamical
understanding of brain function [1-5]. This approach
emphasizes that cognition occurs in an embodied agent
interacting dynamically with its environment and avoids
the assumptions of determinate motor programs and per-
ceptual representations implicit in the computational
framework [6,7]. The identification of the dynamical
changes in an apractic nervous system may provide a caus-
ally mechanistic explanation for the syndrome that may
complement the higher-level descriptive explanation of
the standard computational approach.
The apraxias constitute a spectrum of movement disorders
in which there is impairment in the performance of a
skilled, learned movement that cannot be attributed to an
elementary motor or sensory deficit. Based of the pioneer-
ing work of Liepmann [8], the apraxias have traditionally
been divided into ideational, ideomotor and limb-kinetic
apraxia. Limb-kinetic apraxia, which is felt by many to not
be a true apraxia, manifests as slowness or clumsiness of
distal limb movements with preservation of knowledge of
the appropriate action to perform. Ideational apraxia is
characterized by loss of knowledge of how an object is
used or as impairment in the sequencing of constituent
movements in a complex movement. Ideomotor apraxia
is usually diagnosed on the basis of spatiotemporal errors
that occur on transitive gesture tasks requiring demonstra-
tion of the pantomime appropriate to specific object use
[9]. Asking a patient to demonstrate how they would use
a comb or a hammer would be typical transitive gesture
tasks used in the assessment of the presence or absence of
ideomotor apraxia. In many cases of ideomotor apraxia,
the spatiotemporal errors improve when the object is
actually used rather than when its use is pantomimed. In
addition, the movements are often performed normally
when they occur spontaneously but are impaired when
the patient is instructed to perform the movement. The
patient may scratch his nose spontaneously but may be
unable to perform this task to command. This voluntary-
automatic dissociation, although frequently seen in ideo-
motor apraxia, is not universal [10].
The standard conceptualization of apraxia is based on a
two-system model of action: a conceptual system, located
in the dominant parietal lobe, and a production system
localized to the frontal lobe [11]. Dysfunction of the
former would lead to ideational apraxia and dysfunction
in the latter would result in ideomotor or limb-kinetic
apraxia. With improved knowledge of the multiple fron-
toparietal circuits that subserve visuospatial transforma-
tions for reaching, somatosensory transformations for
postural adjustments and the coding of peripersonal
space for limb and neck movements, it has been possible
to analyze the deficits which occur in apraxia in more
detail than afforded by the standard conceptualization.
Based primarily on primate studies, specialized circuits
responsible for more detailed properties of action have
been identified and provide a framework by which the idi-
osyncratic deficits evident in the apractic patient that defy
explanation by the simple two-system model have been
explained [11].
Regardless of whether the standard two-system scheme of
action or the more detailed model based on multiple, spe-
cialized parietofrontal circuits is used, the standard con-
ceptualization of the origin of apraxia still conforms to the
computational paradigm in which a specific motor pro-
gram is activated based on the conceptual framework in
place in the dominant parietal lobe. Similarly, the usual
explanation for the automatic-voluntary dissociation fre-
quently seen in ideomotor apraxia relies on this computa-
tional framework. This framework postulates that a verbal
command establishes a conceptual bias in the parietal
lobe that activates the appropriate motor program in the
frontal lobe. In ideomotor apraxia there would be a dis-
connection between the instruction and the effector
mechanisms frontally. To explain the preservation of the
corresponding automatic movement, alternative path-
ways not dependent on the parietal lobe would need to
remain functional.
Evolutionary autonomous agents (EAAs) are robots or
robot simulations whose controller is a dynamical neural
network and whose evolution is guided by a genetic algo-
rithm. They are embodied agents-either software pro-
grams living in a virtual environment or true robots that
function in a specified environment. These agents func-
tion autonomously in their environments with the agents
performing such functions as navigation around obsta-
cles, gathering food, seeking prey or mating partners. [12]
Their development is guided by evolutionary algorithms
which utilizes a fitness function to select the most appro-
priate agents for propagation. Motor or sensory activity, in
particular, evolves autonomously in response to the con-
straints of the fitness function without the organizational
restrictions imposed by the notions of determinate motor
programs or perceptual representations. Such agents pro-
vide a system in which the organization of motor or per-
ceptual activity can be followed and analyzed. Because its
nervous system is limited to a small number of neuron-
like elements, the analysis of the network dynamics of
these agents is also more tractable. Their primary value for
the neurosciences is that they provide simple systems
unencumbered by the assumptions inherent in presentBioMedical Engineering OnLine 2005, 4:1 http://www.biomedical-engineering-online.com/content/4/1/1
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day neurosciences that can serve as a test-bed for thinking
about neural processing and techniques for deciphering
these processes [13].
To model the voluntary-automatic dissociation seen in
ideomotor apraxia, a lesioned EAA needs to demonstrate
a behavioral dissociation between a movement that the
agent does automatically and an identical movement that
has a symbolic context. An analysis of the change in net-
work dynamics that occurs in the apractic EAA will pro-
vide information on the physical basis of the dissociation
without the assumptions inherent in a computational for-
malism. The extrapolation of results in the EAA to human
brain function is based on a principle concerning the
organization of complex systems that has been empha-
sized by Herbert Simon. He suggested that the organiza-
tion of self-organizing complex systems is dependent only
on the behavioral characteristics of the system and not the
nature of the constituent elements of the system. "My cen-
tral theme is that complexity takes the form of hierarchy
and that hierarchic systems have some common proper-
ties independent of their specific content" [14]. Regardless
of whether the system consists of 100 billion interacting
living cells or a small number of computer generated
input-output units, it is not inconceivable that the organ-
izational structure of the systems will be similar if their
demands are identical and if they are allowed to evolve
autonomously. In the absence of an evolved agent with
language capabilities, a paradigm is needed that captures
the essential elements of an inability to move to com-
mand with preservation of that same movement if per-
formed spontaneously. It is felt that the ability to move to
a target location without ongoing visual feedback from
the target represents the simplest activity upon which the
dynamics and connectivity of a robotic system could
develop cognitive functions such as off-line reasoning
[15]. Since predicative activity such as language may orig-
inate in this type of network activity, this particular move-
ment paradigm may be used as a surrogate for a verbal
command.
The presence of multiple time scales in the dynamics of a
neural network is indicative of a temporal hierarchical
structure. Simon discussed the presence of higher and
lower frequency dynamics in complex systems and associ-
ated more executive function with the lower frequency
components. He stated that "it is generally believed that
the relevant planning horizon of executives is longer, the
higher their location in the organizational hierarchy" and
that "the average interval between interactions are greater
at higher than lower levels [14]." In the nervous system, it
is also expected that such a multiple time scale framework
would occur with a hierarchical structure requiring more
executive function reflecting lower frequency dynamics
evolving as tasks become more complicated. In this paper,
the temporal hierarchical structure of the dynamics of the
neural network controller of an EAA will be assessed by
the analysis of the power spectral distribution and Hurst
exponent of all nodes in the network [16]. The analysis
will be applied to an EAA model of the voluntary-auto-
matic dissociation seen in ideomotor apraxia in an
attempt to causally explain its physical origin.
Methods
A simulation platform, WEBOTS (Cyberbotics, Switzer-
land), was used to simulate the movement of a Khepera
robot (K-TEAM Corporation, Switzerland) in a dark 1 m
square arena without walls or obstacles. The Khepera is a
two-wheeled mobile robot with eight ambient light sen-
sors and a rotation encoder for each wheel. The Khepera
also has eight infrared proximity sensors but these were
not activated in the present study. The neural network
controller was composed of a layer of 5 fully connected
radial basis function units or neurons. In addition, each
unit projected to the two linear units or motor neurons
and received inputs from the eight light sensors and the
two wheel encoders.
A combined genetic and adaptation algorithm was used
similar to that described by Urzelai and Floreano [17].
Briefly, the first generation at the beginning of the evolu-
tion was composed of a hundred individuals with ran-
domly assigned synaptic weights and adaptation rules. A
chromosome was made up of all the synaptic weights and
their associated adaptation rules. A standard genetic algo-
rithm with cross over and mutation operators were used
with the best twenty individuals selected. The roulette
wheel selection method, wherein the probability of an
individual being selected for a new generation is the indi-
vidual's fitness as a fraction of the total population fitness,
was used. One of five Hebbian adapation rules were asso-
ciated with each weight, the standard Hebbian, presynap-
tic, postsynaptic, covariance [17] and no change.
Although the synaptic weights were altered by the adapta-
tion rule during the life of each individual, it was the pre-
adaptation weights and rules that were transmitted to the
next generation. One individual had a lifespan of 75 sec-
onds. Each sensorimotor cycle was 64 ms allowing adap-
tation to occur over 1172 iterations.
The arena was maintained dark, except at random times
when a light of constant intensity would appear at ran-
dom locations. The robot had to attempt to reach the
light. There were two tasks for the robot during each trial.
In the first task, the robot simply had to go to the light
when it appeared. The light remained on and was extin-
guished when the robot moved to within 2 body diame-
ters, or 7 cm of the light. After a 1–3 s of random delay (in
darkness) another light would appear in the arena at
another random location requiring the robot to approachBioMedical Engineering OnLine 2005, 4:1 http://www.biomedical-engineering-online.com/content/4/1/1
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that light. This would continue for a total of 4–6 constant
lights. The second task began after this series of constant
lights. With the second task the robot had to go to the
location of a brief light flash (1 s or 16 sensorimotor cycles
in duration) that did not persist while the robot
approached the location. Since the robot could not use
light intensity to continuously guide its movement to the
location, successful completion of this task required the
robot to have some notion of objective orientation and
distance. Each trial lasted a total of 75 seconds.
The fitness function F was defined as:
F = T (s)·n
where T (s) = 1 for s ≤ 1 and
T (s) = s for s > 1,
n the number of lights reached, df the average distance of
the robot from the flash point once the flash occurred, tf
the time between flash onset and end of simulation, and
ts the duration of simulation. Mutation rate was in the 0.2
– 0.5% range.
Evolution was continued until the fitness plateaued. Three
populations were evolved requiring up to 1300 genera-
tions before there was a clear plateau. Individuals in each
population were screened for their ability to accomplish
the tasks. Each screening trial was the same as the trials in
which the robots were evolved, that is, a 75 second epoch
during which the robot had to approach several sustained
light locations followed by a single unsustained light
flash. Invariably, individuals appeared first that were able
to go to the sustained light but failed to respond to the
light flash. Eventually, individuals with high fitness were
found that were able to successfully complete both tasks.
From this latter group, lesions were introduced into the
neural networks and the subsequent individual was
screened with the same 75 s trial. Individuals were subse-
quently identified in whom the lesion resulted in the loss
of the ability to move toward the brief light flash with
preservation of the ability to move toward the sustained
light.
The lesions that were introduced into the networks were
inactivations of single synapses. Typically, an individual
that could successfully accomplish both tasks was
screened for apraxia by lesioning each synapse in the net-
work and observing the subsequent behavior of that indi-
vidual. Although individual neurons could have been
inactivated, this approach was avoided because the net-
work only had 5 neurons and the resulting lesioned indi-
vidual often demonstrated gross motor deficits.
Once individuals were identified which could successfully
accomplish both tasks and in whom a specific lesion
resulted in a dissociation between movement towards the
sustained light and movement towards the light flash,
their network dynamics were characterized in two ways.
First, a fast Fourier transform (FFT) was performed on the
activation pattern of all 5 neurons in the network. The
time window chosen in the calculation of the FFT was the
entire test epoch. The Hurst exponent was then calculated
by the average wavelet coefficient method [18] for all 5
neurons in the network again using the entire test epoch.
Results
Five agents were identified which were able to successfully
accomplish both tasks and in whom a lesion resulted in
the dissociation between the two tasks. Analysis was per-
formed on all 5 of the neurons in each individual. Five tri-
als were used in each individual to allow statistical
analysis of the Hurst exponent data.
Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate prototypical data obtained
for one individual which was able to accomplish both
tasks prior to lesioning and demonstrated a dissociation
after lesion. In figure 1, before lesioning, only the trajecto-
ries to the last constant light stimulus followed by the
brief light flash are shown. In figure 2, after lesioning, the
last two trajectories to the sustained light stimuli are
shown with the agent failing to approach the brief light
flash. Individual neuron activity of all 5 neurons for the
entire test epoch before and after lesioning along with the
FFT data of each neuron before and after lesioning is also
shown. The Hurst exponent for the entire epoch for each
neuron is also indicated. Visual inspection of the FFT data
showed a consistent trend in all neurons with a relative
loss of low frequency components in the apractic robots
compared to the normal situation.
We computed the Hurst exponents of the 25 neurons
from the 5 individuals drawn from 3 populations. Five tri-
als were executed for each individual. When comparing
the Hurst exponents for each neuron before and after the
lesion, highly significant differences were obtained (p <
0.03 to 10-7) for 24 of the 25 neurons, with the remaining
neuron showing the same trend but not reaching statisti-
cal significance. The grand average of the 125 Hurst expo-
nents (5 trials each for 25 neurons) was1.0957 ± 0.2325
for the normal condition, and 0.8292 ± 0.1833 for the
apractic condition.
Both the obvious frequency changes in the FFT data and
the Hurst exponent calculations show that the loss of the
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(a) Trajectory of a robot which was able to accomplish both tasks; only the last 3 movements are shown Figure 1
(a) Trajectory of a robot which was able to accomplish both tasks; only the last 3 movements are shown. The robot begins at 
the open triangle. It then moves to position 1 (sustained light) and then to position 2 (brief light flash). (b) Activity from each 
neuron of the network and from the light sensor; data for the entire epoch is shown which constituted movements to 5 differ-
ent sustained lights followed by 1 brief light flash. (c) FFT data for all five neurons calculated over the entire epoch; the value of 
the corresponding Hurst exponent for each neuron is on the top right.
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(a) Trajectory of a lesioned robot which lost the ability to move to the brief light flash; only the last 3 successful movements  are shown Figure 2
(a) Trajectory of a lesioned robot which lost the ability to move to the brief light flash; only the last 3 successful movements 
are shown. The robot begins at the open triangle. It then moves to position 1 (sustained light) and then to position 2 (sustained 
light). The robot remained at position 2 despite the occurrence of a brief light flash at position 3. (b) Activity from each neuron 
of the lesioned network and from the light sensor; data for the entire epoch is shown which constituted movements to 6 dif-
ferent sustained lights and inability to move to the brief light flash. (c) FFT data for all five neurons of the lesioned robot over 
the entire epoch. The value of the corresponding Hurst exponent of each neuron is on the top right.
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ability to perform a movement that has a symbolic con-
text is associated with a loss in the longer time scales (low
frequency components) in the hierarchical organization
of the neural network Since the calculation of the Hurst
exponent is based on the full test epoch and since most of
the robot movement during this period was the move-
ment to the constant light rather than the light flash, this
result also demonstrates that the strategy for both move-
ments was influenced by the lesion despite maintained
ability to move to the constant light.
Discussion
Despite significant advances in the understanding of the
anatomy and physiology of normal movement and the
pathophysiology of movement disorders, their concep-
tual framework still relies on the computational paradigm
used by cognitive science and neuroscience for decades.
This approach assumes the existence of determinate struc-
tures in the CNS that are manipulated in the same fashion
that a computer manipulates symbols or language com-
bines words. In the last 10 years, there has been a shift in
focus with appreciation of the limitations of the computa-
tional approach and the realization of the importance of
embodiment in conceptualization of motor behavior.
When the social and the environmental influences on
behavior are analyzed without prejudice, it becomes clear
that indeterminacy is a hallmark of our functioning [19]
and the idea of determinate perceptual representations
and motor programs is an assumption commensurate
with the approach of the natural sciences in general. This
indeterminacy is captured in the formalism of dynamical
systems theory. EAAs provide a system by which develop-
ment of cognitive structures evolve in an embodied agent
constrained only by the nature of the environment and
the definition of fitness. They assume no structural char-
acteristics of perception or movement but provide a
forum by which sensorimotor structures arise as the
organism self organizes in response to its interaction with
the environment. Because they possess a simple network
controller, the analysis of their development and architec-
ture is more tractable than a similar analysis of the human
nervous system.
We have demonstrated that in an evolved agent with two
modes of environmental interaction that can be viewed as
automatic and symbolic, lesions that produce the equiva-
lent of the automatic-voluntary dissociation seen in ideo-
motor apraxia cause a change in the hierarchical
organization of its dynamical neural network controller
with a loss of the longer duration time scales correspond-
ing to the loss of symbolic function. Two techniques were
utilized to demonstrate these changes in the network
dynamics, a Fourier analysis of the activity of all 5 neurons
in the network and the calculation of the their Hurst expo-
nents. With Fourier analysis, EAAs that were able to suc-
cessfully perform both tasks demonstrated a 1/f power
spectral distribution. This type of scale free distribution
has been encountered in a number of physical and biolog-
ical systems including heart rate variability, electrical cur-
rents and reaction times in human cognition [16,20]. The
1/f distribution has also been associated with self-organ-
ized criticality, a theory of the internal interactions of large
systems that has been postulated to govern such diverse
natural phenomena as the size of avalanches and earth-
quakes [21]. This 1/f pattern was altered in the apractic
EAAs indicating that this abnormal behavior was associ-
ated with a loss of the lower frequency components in the
network dynamics. The calculation of the Hurst exponent
is based on long range correlations over all time scales in
the signal of interest and is a measure of persistence or
memory, that is, how long a given fluctuation in a time
series will be reflected in future values of the series [18].
The larger the value of the exponent, the more dominant
are low frequencies in the time signal. EAAs that could
successfully perform both tasks had a larger value of the
Hurst exponent compared to the lesioned, apractic agents
again indicating the loss of low frequency components in
the network dynamics of the apractic agents.
Does the EAA paradigm described capture the essential
features necessary to causally explain the automatic-vol-
untary dissociation seen in ideomotor apraxia? Ideally, to
most reliably model this phenomenon, an EAA would
need to have language capabilities. Barring that, it is
argued that the ability to move to a target site without the
continued visual presence of that target captures the min-
imal requirements necessary to extrapolate to the case of a
verbal command. Although controversy exists concerning
the conceptual or operational definition of internal repre-
sentations in evolved agents [22,23], Clark has argued
that the notion of representation remains valuable in
evolved robotic systems and can be defined well enough
to discuss the physical basis of cognition [15]. He distin-
guished between what he called weak and strong repre-
sentations. A weak representation in a robotic system is
the dynamics and connectivity of the network which is
associated with a behavior requiring ongoing sensory
feedback. A movement that is done spontaneously and
automatically would be a type of behavior whose under-
lying network would use a weak representation. A strong
representation in a robotic system is the network dynam-
ics and connectivity associated with a behavior that does
not require ongoing sensory feedback for its successful
execution. He argued that the kind of network organiza-
tion that supports movement in the absence of visual
feedback, such as the movement of an EAA to a target flash
location, is the simplest kind of strong representation and
is prototypical of representations in robotic systems that
could support more sophisticated cognitive processes
including off-line reasoning. Since language capabilityBioMedical Engineering OnLine 2005, 4:1 http://www.biomedical-engineering-online.com/content/4/1/1
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would require the presence of strong representations, it
was felt that the movement of an EAA to a target location
without continued visual presence of the target was an
acceptable surrogate for a verbal command.
It was clear while individual EAAs were being observed as
they performed the trial in the normal and apractic condi-
tions that the apractic robots often demonstrated minor
deficits even in the case in which they were approaching
the sustained light target. Usually, this took the form of a
mild slowness in movement although other deficits were
seen such as altered trajectories toward the sustained light
source. It has been assumed that patients with ideomotor
apraxia function normally in the environments to which
they are accustomed and in which automatic behavior is
expected. This has also been suggested as a reason why
apraxia is not detected as frequently as its true incidence
predicts [10]. This clear cut dissociation would also be
predicted by a computational formalism since distinct
and determinate motor programs would lend themselves
to inactivation of one with maintenance of the other.
Recently, this idea has been disputed and, in fact, careful
examination of apractic patients reveals deficits even in
movements that are performed automatically [10]. The
results in our EAA simulation corroborates this more
recent analysis. Since determinate motor programs or per-
ceptual representation do not exist in the EAAs, it would
be expected that a lesion in the network would have some
effect on all aspects of the agent's motor performance.
The notion that a lesion that causes apraxia has a global
effect on the patient that is not restricted to those func-
tions that can be considered symbolic was elaborated in
detail by Merleau-Ponty [19]. He performed an extensive
existential analysis of one patient, Schneider by name,
who had suffered a shell injury to his brain. Merleau-
Ponty suggested that the standard empirical or cognitive
explanations of the nature of apraxia are limited because
they fail to take into consideration the phenomenology of
apraxia. According to Merleau-Ponty, "Beneath the intelli-
gence as an anonymous function or as a categorical proc-
ess, a personal core has to be recognized, which is the
patient's being, his power of existing. It is here that illness
has its seat". He argued that it is "ridiculous to think that
the shell splinter directly struck symbolic consciousness"
but rather "any pathological degeneration should affect
the whole of consciousness." This phenomenological
insight was mirrored in the observation that lesions that
resulted in a behavioral dissociation in the EAAs had an
influence on the dynamics of the network even in the
tasks that were behaviorly unchanged. By avoiding the
assumptions inherent in the computational framework
and by evolving hierarchical self-organization, including
symbolic thought, from the most basic level of sensorim-
otor interactions in an embodied agent, EAAs provide the
optimal framework by which these phenomenological
observations on the nature of apraxia can be modeled. In
fact, taking phenomenological accuracy in addition to
physiological plausibility as a constraint in the selection
of those EAAs that successfully perform a behavioral task
will help to discover those networks whose architecture
and function most closely parallel those of the human
nervous system [24].
Conclusion
In an embodied agent with two modes of environmental
interaction which can be viewed as automatic and sym-
bolic, lesions that produce the experimental equivalent of
voluntary-automatic dissociation of ideomotor apraxia
cause a change in the hierarchical organization of its
dynamical neural network controller with a loss of the
longer duration time scales corresponding to the loss of
symbolic function. The identification of the dynamical
changes in an apractic nervous system may provide a caus-
ally mechanistic explanation for the syndrome that may
complement the higher-order descriptive explanation of
the standard computational approach. The methodology
of EAAs is just beginning to be recognized and it is hoped
that further studies can be performed with this methodol-
ogy to further understand the physical origin of normal
and pathological brain function.
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